intotheeast-com/docs/solutions/architecture-patterns/git-sync-secret-exposure-and-tracked-file-boomerang.md

---
title: "Secret exposure under bidirectional Grav git-sync: gitignore is the only boundary (and the tracked-file boomerang trap)"
date: 2026-07-05
module: git-sync
problem_type: architecture_pattern
component: tooling
severity: high
category: architecture-patterns
applies_when:
  - "Enabling bidirectional Grav git-sync (direction: both, on_save: true) so prod can push content back to Gitea"
  - "Auditing whether the server can leak secrets (tokens, password hashes, signing salts) off the production host"
  - "A per-install runtime-generated value is being persisted into a tracked config file that also carries functional config"
  - "Deciding where a per-install secret must live so it never round-trips"
  - "A config value keeps ping-ponging or re-committing itself across environments after each sync"
tags:
  - git-sync
  - secret-exposure
  - gitignore
  - grav
  - popularity-salt
  - config-boundary
  - bidirectional-sync
  - per-install-secret
  - env-tree-leak
---

# Secret exposure under bidirectional Grav git-sync: gitignore is the only boundary (and the tracked-file boomerang trap)

> **Correction (2026-07-05):** An earlier version of this doc claimed the sync
> add-set was *scoped to the configured `folders`*, and concluded that
> `accounts/` and `user/env/` were "safe by construction" because they sit
> outside `pages/config/themes`. **That model is wrong and caused a live secret
> leak.** git-sync's auto-commit stages files **outside** the configured folders;
> the only reliable exclusion is `.gitignore`. The corrected model is below.

## Context

The intotheeast.com Grav site runs the `git-sync` plugin on production in
**bidirectional** mode: `direction: both`, `on_save: true`, a webhook at
`/_git-sync`, and configured `folders: pages, config, themes`. Bidirectional
means the server both *pulls* content authored elsewhere **and** *pushes*
content authored on the server (Admin edits, `/post` submissions, uploads) back
to the shared Gitea repo.

The operator's question was: **"Can I safely enable bidirectional prod → Gitea
sync without leaking secrets?"** Production holds things that must never reach a
shared repo — API tokens, JWT signing secrets, CSRF salts, the git-sync token
itself.

The dangerous, tempting answer is "the plugin only syncs `pages/config/themes`,
so anything outside those folders is safe." **This is false, and acting on it
leaked secrets.** See the incident below.

## The incident (what actually happened)

Production's git-sync auto-commit `9337003` ("(Grav GitSync) Automatic Commit
...") pushed the **entire `user/env/intotheeast.com/config/` tree** to Gitea —
including `api-private.php` (JWT secret), `security-private.php` (CSRF salt), and
`git-sync.yaml` (the sync **token + webhook secret**) — plus `accounts/mischa.yaml`
(password hash), `system.yaml`, and `post-form.md`.

**None of those paths is under the configured `folders: pages, config, themes`.**
`user/env/` is a sibling of `user/config/`, not a subfolder of it. Yet git-sync
staged and pushed them anyway. That single fact refutes the "folders scope the
add-set" model empirically: **the `folders` setting does not scope what the
auto-commit stages.** Whatever git-sync's exact `git add` invocation, the
operational truth is that its commit sweeps the whole `user/` working tree.

Remediation: disable sync → `.gitignore` `/env/` and `git rm --cached` it →
`reset --hard` prod to the gitignored state → regenerate the leaked JWT/CSRF
salts (delete the `*-private.php` files; Grav regenerates them) → **rotate the
Gitea token and webhook secret** (they were exposed in `git-sync.yaml`). Rotation
is what actually neutralizes the leak; the history rewrite is optional for a
private repo.

## Guidance

The safety question reduces to one predicate — but **not** the one the original
doc used:

> **A file round-trips to the shared repo if and only if it is NOT gitignored.**
> The configured `folders` setting does **not** narrow this. Treat the
> round-trippable set as *everything under `user/` that git will track* — i.e.
> everything not matched by `user/.gitignore`.

Consequences, corrected:

1. **`.gitignore` is the only reliable boundary.** Do not rely on a file being
   "outside the synced folders." If it is under `user/` and not gitignored, a
   bidirectional sync can push it. Design exclusions with `.gitignore`, and
   verify with `git -C user status` / `git -C user check-ignore <path>`.

2. **`accounts/` is NOT structurally excluded.** `user/accounts/*.yaml` (bcrypt
   password hashes) is a *tracked* content folder and is not gitignored, so it
   **does** round-trip — `accounts/mischa.yaml` was in the leak commit. If you
   need an account file to stay server-local, it must be gitignored explicitly
   (as `accounts/testrunner.yaml` already is). The earlier "password hashes never
   leave the server" claim was wrong.

3. **The per-environment tree `user/env/<host>/` MUST be gitignored** — it is
   **not** inherently safe. It holds the live git-sync token, JWT secret, and
   CSRF salt (Grav writes all server-side Admin config there once the env dir
   exists). Because it is not under `user/config/` people assumed it was outside
   the sync scope; the incident proved it is not. It is now gitignored
   (`/env/` in `user/.gitignore`, commit `6e8eadb`). Keep it that way.

   > Side effect worth remembering: once `user/env/<host>/` exists, Grav's Admin
   > writes **all** config changes there (system and plugin), not into
   > `user/config/`. So server-side Admin edits are server-only — but "server-only"
   > now depends entirely on `/env/` being gitignored, not on folder scope. When
   > auditing, check **both** `user/config/...` and `user/env/<host>/config/...`
   > (env wins at runtime). See `docs/working/git-sync-notes.md`.

4. **Per-install secrets go in gitignored companion files.** Grav's convention
   splits a per-install secret out of the functional YAML into a sibling that is
   gitignored: the JWT secret in `api-private.php`, the CSRF/nonce + rate-limit
   salt in `security-private.php`, plus `security.yaml` and `versions.yaml`.
   These are safe **because they are gitignored**, not because of where they sit.

Run every secret through predicate #1 (is it gitignored?) and the answer falls
out — but you must actually enumerate what is *not* gitignored, not what is
"outside the folders."

### The tracked-file boomerang (a separate trap)

Independently of the folder-scope error above, there is a second trap that the
original doc got right and that still holds: **a per-install value that a plugin
regenerates at runtime and persists into a tracked, functional config file.**

The concrete case: the `api` plugin's *popularity* feature generates
`popularity.salt` and writes it **into `user/config/plugins/api.yaml`** — a file
that also carries must-be-shared functional config. That file is tracked, so on
prod the popularity feature regenerates the salt, git-sync stages the change,
commits, and **pushes prod's salt back to the shared repo**. Another environment
pulls it, regenerates *its own* salt, pushes again. The value **ping-pongs across
installs**, producing endless noise commits.

The critical realization: **you cannot gitignore a single key inside a file that
also carries functional config.** `.gitignore` operates on whole files. `api.yaml`
must be tracked because the rest of it must be shared; therefore the salt inside
it is tracked too; therefore it boomerangs.

### The rules

For any per-install runtime-generated value, pick one of exactly three
resolutions — and do **not** reach for the fourth (stripping the line), which
cannot work under sync:

- **Isolate the value into a gitignored companion `<name>-private.php`** — the
  pattern Grav uses for the JWT secret via `api-private.php`.
- **Disable the feature that generates it** (e.g. `popularity.enabled: false`).
- **Consciously accept the churn** when the value is genuinely low-stakes
  (`popularity.salt` is an IP-hashing salt, not a credential).

Do **not** keep stripping the value from the tracked file — bidirectional sync
brings it right back on the next save.

### Before / after: what sticks and what doesn't

**A standalone file gitignored + untracked sticks.** For `security-private.php`
(a file that contains *only* the secret) or the whole `user/env/` tree:

```bash
git -C user rm --cached -r config/security-private.php   # or: rm --cached -r env
printf '/config/security-private.php\n/env/\n' >> user/.gitignore
```

This works permanently. The path is no longer tracked, so the sync's add-set
skips it forever. The fix sticks because the secret owns its own gitignored path.

**A key inside a tracked functional file — stripping the line does NOT stick.**
For `popularity.salt` inside `api.yaml`, deleting just the `salt:` line and
committing looks clean locally, but Grav re-appends it at runtime and the next
sync re-commits and re-pushes it. The only durable fixes are the
companion-private-file pattern or disabling the feature.

## Why This Matters

Two quiet, cross-environmental failure modes:

1. **The folder-scope illusion.** Assuming "only `pages/config/themes` sync" is a
   security control leads you to leave secrets in `env/` or `accounts/` unignored
   — and a single Admin save on prod pushes them to a shared repo. This actually
   happened here. The only defensible mental model is *gitignore is the boundary*;
   enumerate the un-ignored set, not the "un-foldered" set.

2. **The boomerang.** A "cleanup" commit that strips a secret from a *tracked*
   file looks done locally but silently reappears upstream on the next content
   save, because the plugin regenerates it and the sync re-commits it.

Getting both right is what lets you answer "is bidirectional sync safe?" honestly.
The answer is **yes, once `user/.gitignore` actually excludes every sensitive
path** — `env/`, the per-install `*-private.php` files, `security.yaml`,
`versions.yaml`, and any account file that must stay server-local — and once every
runtime-regenerated value either lives in its own gitignored file or is a
consciously-accepted low-stakes churn. It is emphatically **not** safe on the
strength of folder scoping alone.

## When to Apply

- **Enabling or auditing bidirectional git-sync** on a server that authors
  content. Enumerate the round-trippable set as *everything under `user/` not
  matched by `.gitignore`* — then confirm no secret is in it.
- **Deciding where a new secret or per-install generated value should live.**
  Standalone gitignored file for anything sensitive; never a key inside a shared
  functional YAML; never "outside the folders" as the sole justification.
- **Reviewing a "stop tracking this secret" cleanup** for whether it will stick:
  is the secret in its own gitignored path (holds) or a line inside a tracked
  functional file that something regenerates (boomerangs)?

## Examples

**The leak (what "folder scope is safe" cost).** With `folders: pages, config,
themes` and `/env/` **not** gitignored, prod's auto-commit `9337003` pushed
`user/env/intotheeast.com/config/**` (JWT, CSRF salt, git-sync token + webhook
secret), `accounts/mischa.yaml`, `system.yaml`, and `post-form.md` to Gitea —
all outside the configured folders. Fix: gitignore + untrack `/env/`, regenerate
the JWT/CSRF salts, **rotate the token and webhook secret**.

**Safe after remediation.** Same bidirectional config, but now `user/.gitignore`
excludes `/env/`, `config/plugins/git-sync.yaml`, `config/plugins/api-private.php`,
`config/security.yaml`, `config/security-private.php`, `config/versions.yaml`.
Running each secret through *is-it-gitignored*: all sensitive paths are excluded →
none is in the round-trippable set. Verified: prod's `git status` shows only the
intended tracked content, and no boomerang/secret commit lands on the remote.

**Boomerang example.** `popularity.salt` in the tracked `api.yaml` regenerates
per-install and re-commits under sync. The fix that *sticks* is the
companion-private-file pattern or `popularity.enabled: false` — **not** stripping
the `salt:` line.

## Related

- `docs/solutions/conventions/grav-plugin-config-must-be-tracked-override.md` — the
  origin of the "functional plugin config in tracked `user/config/plugins/`,
  secrets/per-install values in gitignored `*-private.php`" rule. That doc covers
  *where config must live to deploy*; this doc covers *why gitignore — not folder
  scope — is the sync boundary, and why a runtime-written tracked value boomerangs*.
- `docs/working/git-sync-notes.md` — operational notes on git-sync's synced
  folders and the per-environment tree. Corrected in the same 2026-07-05 pass to
  drop the "env/ is outside the sync scope so it's safe" claim.
- `docs/solutions/integration-issues/stale-grav-version-blocks-api-plugin-install.md`
  — adjacent context from the same Grav production cutover, different failure mode.